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Abstract—Process-aware information systems (PAIS) 
supporting knowledge-intensive processes are gaining 
importance nowadays. Crisis management process is an example 
of a knowledge-intensive process that is grounded on vast 
experience of multiple actors (e.g., city services, volunteers, 
administration) and their collaboration. Automated crisis 
management systems have to comply with various norms and 
regulations; at the same time, they need to constantly deal with 
uncertainty and adapt the process scenario to a current situation. 
In this paper, we consider the example of a flood management 
process implemented as a part of the COS Operation Center 
(COSOC) - a smart city solution that works with knowledge-
intensive processes. We examine how the activity-oriented 
modeling paradigm underlying COSOC supports process 
flexibility. We propose an alternative way to specify the flood 
management process based on state-oriented paradigm and the 
statecharts formalism and discuss the advantages and limitations 
of the two paradigms. 
Keywords—business process modeling; crisis management 
processes; activity-oriented modeling formalism; state-oriented 
modeling formalism; BPMN; statecharts. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Crisis management is the process followed by an 
organization to deal with a major event that threatens to harm 
the organization itself, its stakeholders, or the general public. 
[1]. 
City administrations are particularly concerned with crisis 
management. Examples of crisis city may have to deal with 
include natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, landslides etc.), 
technological accidents (e.g., power plant accident, among 
others. 
Crisis management process is safety-critical – its failure 
could result in loss of life, significant property or environment 
damage. To ensure safety and security, the activities performed 
during crisis management are highly regulated at the city or 
federal level. These activities and their order of execution are 
described in operation scenarios, procedures, emergency plans, 
which are used by the concerned public services (fire fighters, 
rescue, police, etc.) for regular drills and field trainings. 
According to the situation, a concrete scenario is selected from 
a predefined set: to assess the current situation, a number of 
critical parameters is taken into consideration (e.g., traffic 
condition, water level). Unforeseen situations, i.e., the 
situations that are not or only partly covered by the predefined 
scenarios and procedures, are handled by human actor(s): in 
simple cases, the process manager is authorized to define and 
launch a new workflow based on her experience; in more 
complex situations, which require a higher level of expertise, a 
decision is made by a specially assigned committee (e.g., a 
board of experts). 
Modern city administrations seek to automate crisis 
management, implementing it as a part of their process-aware 
information systems (PAIS). In the following, we examine the 
characteristics of crisis, in order to define the requirements for 
PAIS that would support automated crisis management 
processes. 
Crisis management is widely addressed by researchers in 
management science: in [34][35][36] leading ideas on crisis 
management in a business environment are presented; in 
[37][38] the context, concepts and practice of risk and crisis 
management in the public sector are discussed; in [39], a 
multidisciplinary approach to crisis management research, 
using psychological, social-political, and technological-
structural research perspectives is defined. These works are 
mostly oriented on federal agencies, city administration, policy 
makers, practitioners and researchers in management and 
business administration. Up to our knowledge, only a few 
works are discussing the challenges of crisis management or its 
supporting information systems. An example is [40], where a 
lack of context-awareness (meteorological data and rainfall 
sensors) leads to a failure to adapt water release plans produced 
by a context-aware information system (CAIS), resulting in a 
severe flood event in Brisbane, Australia. 
In our work, we consider crisis management as a particular 
case of knowledge-intensive process and focus on its "process" 
perspective. 
Crisis management process is an example of a knowledge-
intensive process (KiPs) [41]: it is unstructured and based on 
collaboration between actors; tacit knowledge of human actors, 
which is not embedded in the process model à priori, plays the 
central role in this process. 
Davenport evaluates knowledge intensity by the diversity 
and uncertainty of process input and output [3]. A knowledge-
intensive process is characterized by activities that may change 
on the fly, are driven by the scenario the process is embedded 
in and, most importantly, depend on the completeness of 
available contextual information. The set of users who should 
be involved in each step of the process may not be defined in 
advance and rather needs to be discovered as the process 
scenario unfolds. 
Therefore, the requirements for PAIS supporting crisis 
management can be also applied to PAIS supporting KiPs. 
A threat occurrence, the element of surprise, and a short 
decision time are common to a crisis [2]. These characteristics 
define the unpredictable nature of the management scenario. 
Instead of creating strategies for events that might occur in the 
future, crisis management involves reacting to an event once it 
has occurred. 
During the crisis management, its supporting PAIS has to 
provide control over the process execution in order to 
guarantee the compliance with norms and regulations. Process 
flexibility is another fundamental need for a system supporting 
crisis management. According to [4], process flexibility can be 
summarized as three abilities: 
(a) the ability to deal with uncertainty  
(b) the ability to adapt process scenarios at run-time and  
(c) the ability to evolve processes. 
Explicit specifications of underlying processes play an 
important role in PAIS: they allow for better communication 
between stakeholders, enable process analysis and support 
redesign efforts [5]. In this work we show that the capacity of 
PAIS to support process flexibility is inherent to the underlying 
process modeling paradigm. In particular, we consider activity-
oriented and state-oriented paradigms and discuss their 
advantages and limitations in supporting the three abilities 
mentioned above. 
We illustrate our findings on the example of a flood 
management process – a crisis management process, 
implemented as a part of the COS Operation Center (COSOC). 
COSOC is a process-aware information system developed by 
COS&HT [6] in Russia. Since 2013, the COSOC solution has 
been used by the city administration of Novgorod. Underlying 
processes for COSOC (including flood management process) 
were designed with BPMN, following a widely accepted 
activity-driven paradigm. 
To assess the ability of the system to deal with uncertainty, 
we need to study how the system collects and processes data in 
order to adequately assess the current situation. In our case 
study, we formulate it as our first research question: 
1) How does the flood management process model 
support the run-time assessment of a crisis situation? 
To assess the ability to adapt process scenarios at run-time, 
we need to study how the system supports the user, i.e., the 
process manager, in his/her “on-action” decision-making 
(especially in the situations not covered by the predefined 
operation scenarios). We formulate the second research 
question: 
2) How does the flood management process model support 
the run-time assessment of a crisis situation? 
To assess the ability of the system to evolve processes, we 
need to study how the system supports the user, i.e., process 
manager, in his/her “after-action” analysis and knowledge 
management activities. We formulate our third research 
question:  
3) How does the flood management process model 
assimilate the new scenarios proposed by the process 
manager? What is the cycle of process evolution or redesign? 
We examine the current specification of the flood 
management process designed using BPMN (our case study) 
focusing on the defined research questions.  Then we propose 
an alternative model based on the state-oriented paradigm and 
discuss its advantages with regard to the activity-oriented 
paradigm. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in 
Section 2 we discuss process modeling paradigms and study 
their support of flexibility in process models. In Section 3we 
present the COS Operation Center and the example of flood 
management process. In Section 4 we discuss the BPMN 
specification of the flood management process used in 
COSOC and examine how the activity-oriented paradigm 
supports the process flexibility. In section 5 we propose an 
alternative way to specify the flood management process 
based on the state-oriented paradigm and the statecharts 
formalism. In Section 6 we discuss the advantages and 
limitations of the two paradigms, present our conclusions and 
directions for the future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we present various process modeling 
paradigms and discuss their capacity to support flexibility in 
process models. 
Within the activity-oriented paradigm, a process is 
specified as an ordered set of activities that the system has to 
carry out. Examples of activity- oriented formalisms include 
BPMN [7], YAWL [8], activity diagrams in UML [9] and 
other languages based on workflow concepts. 
Activity-oriented process modeling implies that data 
emerges and evolves within a process according to a 
predefined control flow. Events are supposed to occur (or be 
processed) at specific moments of the execution predefined by 
the model. This paradigm suits predictable and highly 
repeatable processes. Crisis management processes are 
unpredictable [10]: events and process inputs can occur at any 
time during the executions; the order of activities can therefore 
not be predefined and depends on the current situation. Such 
behavior can thus not be captured by the workflow formalism. 
In order to increase process flexibility and to better address 
unstructured and knowledge-intensive processes, activity-
oriented formalisms have been extended with declarative 
parts, such as constraints [11], business rules [12] or 
configurable elements [13]. These formalisms can handle 
process variability within a potentially large number of 
configurations or scenarios. However, either such scenarios 
must be well identified upfront or the set of business rules (or 
configuration elements) must be regularly maintained by an 
expert. This can be seen as a limitation for crisis management 
processes. 
According to the product-oriented (or state-oriented) 
paradigm, a process is seen as a product life cycle (i.e., a set 
of product states and transitions between these states). 
Examples of product-oriented modeling formalisms include 
state machines in UML [14], generic state-transition systems 
or state machines, such as FSM [15] or Petri Nets [16], and 
statecharts by D. Harel [17] created for the specification and 
analysis of complex discrete-event systems. 
Traditional FSMs and their corresponding state-transition 
diagrams are efficient for tackling small problems. However, 
the complexity of a FSM model tends to grow much faster 
than the complexity of the problem it represents. This "state 
explosion problem" can be overcome by the introduction of 
multiple hierarchical levels for states and transitions. Indeed, 
this hierarchy gives a possibility to reuse some common 
behaviors across many states and, thus, to reduce the model 
complexity. This idea is explored in the formalism of 
statecharts [14][17]. 
The statecharts formalism specifies hierarchical state 
machines (HSM); it extends classical FSM by providing: 
• depth – the possibility to model states at multiple 
hierarchical levels, with the notion of 
abstraction/refinement between levels; 
• orthogonality – the possibility to model concurrent or 
independent submachines within one state machine; 
• broadcast communication – the possibility to synchronize 
multiple concurrent submachines via events. 
Within the state-oriented formalism, carried out activities 
depend on the current state of the product and the process 
scenario is adapted at run time, according to the evolution of 
the product. This paradigm suits well reactive systems 
specification [18] since the system’s response to an event shall 
be defined not only by the type of this event but also by the 
current situation of the system i.e., its state. 
Several research groups have reported on approaches to 
design and specify unstructured, knowledge-intensive 
processes based on the product-oriented paradigm: 
• In [19], process instances are represented as moving 
through state space, and the process model is represented 
as a set of formal rules describing valid trajectories. This 
approach is grounded on the theory of automated control 
systems. 
• In [20], a group of researchers from IBM propose an 
approach that incorporates process- and data-centered 
perspectives and is based on the concept of business 
artifacts. 
• In [21], the Product-Based Workflow Design is presented. 
This approach explores the interaction between a product 
data model that reflects the product design and the process 
to manufacture this product represented by a workflow. 
• The authors of [22] present case handling as a paradigm 
for supporting knowledge-intensive business processes. 
The authors compare case handling to workflow 
management and identify four problems. In particular, they 
recognize the lack of flexibility of workflow management 
systems and acknowledge the important role played by the 
“product” - the case - in the case handling. Their view on 
the case, however, remains activity-oriented: the proposed 
case definition explicitly includes the list of activities and 
their precedence relations assuming that they are known in 
advance. 
The decision or goal-oriented paradigm extends the 
product-oriented view on the process: the successive 
transformations of the product are looked upon as 
consequences of decisions leading to some goal [23]. 
Goal-oriented modeling formalisms (examples include 
i*[24], KAOS [25], MAP [26]) support decision making by 
specifying goal hierarchies and tracing each decision within 
these hierarchies. Context-driven goal-oriented process 
models [27][28][29] support automated recommendations and 
user guidance, providing that for each goal all the situations 
(states) in which this goal is achievable are known. However, 
due to unpredictable sequences of events and non-repeatable 
execution scenarios in knowledge-intensive process, it will be 
hard if at all possible to model relations between various 
process situations, goals and activities that must/can be 
executed in order to achieve these goals. 
In this work we discuss crisis management processes. In 
particular, we examine the example of flood management 
process. While being highly regulated, crisis management 
requires flexibility and reactivity and never follows the same 
scenario. While activity-oriented paradigm remains the main 
choice for process designers, we claim that the state-oriented 
paradigm has a great potential for specification of knowledge-
intensive processes and crisis management processes in 
particular. 
III. COS OPERATION CENTER SOLUTION FOR FLOOD 
MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDY 
In this section we present the COS operation center 
(COSOC) – a cross-domain information system developed by 
COS &HT in Russia. The system is used by the administration 
of Novgorod city and is planned for installation for the 
administration of Moscow Region and Krasnodar Region. 
COSOC supports a large variety of processes within the 
city, including crisis management processes. We also 
introduce an example of a crisis management process: a flood 
management process, implemented as a part of COSOC. 
A. COS Operation Center 
The Operation Center is a process-aware information 
system used by a government to manage the variety of 
processes and cross-domain operations within the city, ranging 
from paper issuing for citizens, garbage collection, public 
transport management to monitoring and management of large 
scale emergencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. A screenshot of the COSOC executive dashboard. The dashboard is 
divided into three areas: the city map, the list of events and the list of data 
sources for monitoring the situation on the object 
The Operation Center provides the authorities with relevant 
information across the entire city through a common 
information space (executive dashboard). This dashboard 
contains data from various sources; it allows city service 
managers to have a full and comprehensive understanding of 
the issues and to coordinate the operation of multiple agencies 
in real time. 
The functions of COSOC can be roughly divided into three 
groups: (i) data collection and visualization, (ii) analysis of the 
situation and decision making and (iii) triggering response 
processes.  
COSOC collects the data related to different areas of the 
city life in a real time and visualizes this data on the executive 
dashboard (Fig.1). This dashboard lists the events in the 
summary table, with an option of sorting on key parameters 
(level of danger, urgency of response, etc.), and shows their 
geographical location on the map. Stationary and mobile video 
cameras, embedded sensors measuring traffic density, 
pollution concentration, temperature, radioactivity, calls and 
emails from citizens reporting on anomalies and accidents are 
examples of data sources used by COSOC. 
The collected data is used for calculating key indicators 
(KI) that are used to assess a situation in the different city 
areas. The key indicators are visualized in a Colored KI matrix 
(Fig.2). This matrix provides an integrated and hierarchical 
view on the current situation in the city. Each cell of this matrix 
in Fig. 2 corresponds to an area of the city activity: electricity 
supply, water supply, healthcare, ecology and meteorology, 
transport and so on.  The color of the cell indicates a situation: 
green – normal, yellow – alert, red – reaction is required and 
purple – emergency. The process manager can zoom into a cell 
for more detailed views, where the sub-areas and the values of 
their corresponding key indicators are displayed. 
When an indicator exceeds some critical value (e.g., a 
traffic jam is detected or pollution exceeds a certain threshold), 
the system modifies the Colored KI matrix respectively and, if 
applicable, automatically triggers a response workflow from 
the predefined list. If a solution cannot be triggered 
automatically, COSOC generates a message for the process 
manager and proposes to choose a workflow from the list of 
available solutions. 
 
Fig. 2. A screenshot of a high-level view of the Colored KI matrix in COSOC. 
Each cell indicates an area of the city activity; the color code indicates the 
status (from normal – green, to emergency – purple). The process manager can 
zoom-in the cell in order to see the details 
The COSOC process manager is a member of the city 
administration who is responsible for monitoring the situation 
and handling emerging issues. He/she can accept or decline the 
solution proposed by the system; when a workflow is triggered, 
he/she monitors its execution and intervenes when decision-
making is required. 
When the problematic situation is resolved, the process 
manager can provide feedback to the system: request for 
process improvement, modification of KI list, etc. All change 
requests are treated by the technical support team of COSOC 
and have to undergo a formal approval process before being 
implemented. 
 The following section presents an example of a flood 
management process on the Oka River in the Moscow region in 
Russia. 
B. Crisis Management in Case of Floods 
A flood is an overflow of water that submerges a land that 
is normally dry. Floods on the Oka River in the Moscow region 
are seasonal events caused by an increase in the flow of the 
river, provoked by intensive snow melting during the spring 
months. Cities built along the Oka River are confronted to the 
risk of flooding and can expect important damages, affecting 
thousands of people. Floods on Oka also represent substantial 
risks for the critical infrastructure facilities situated in the area: 
a railway bridge, a pontoon road bridge, an electric power 
plant, industrial storage facilities, etc. 
Along with other types of crisis, the flood management 
process is highly regulated by federal authorities, including the 
ministry for Emergency Situations (MES), the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense. For example, any 
crisis management process has to comply with the Emergency 
Management Guidelines [30] defined by MES. This document 
prescribes the activities that have to be carried before, during 
and after crisis situations by different public services and 
agencies of the city. 
Contextual parameters such as water level, temperature, 
characteristics of flooded areas, status of the ongoing response 
operations etc., are collected by COSOC and displayed on the 
executive dashboard and colored KI matrix described in the 
previous section. 
The flood alert is triggered when the daily temperature rises 
above a certain average defined for the season and holds for 
several days, provoking intensive snow melting in the area. 
The flood emergency is triggered when the water level in the 
Oka River rises above 10 cm. 
Table I provides a brief description of the major phases of 
the flood on the Oka River. 
MES and other regulating authorities define a distinctive 
list of operation procedures (i.e., responses) that have to be 
executed for each of the major phase defined in Table I. 
Nevertheless, there exist situations where the predefined 
operation procedures are not sufficient: disrupted 
telecommunication, electricity and water supply, lack of 
equipment or impossibility to deploy/relocate the required 
equipment – are examples of situations that compromise the 
predefined operation procedures and have to be resolved “on a 
case basis” by a human actor - the process manager. The 
process manager monitors the situation using the executive 
dashboard and the colored KI matrix and proposes the 
scenarios based on his/her experience and understanding of the 
situation. 
TABLE I.  FLOOD SCENARIO DRIVEN BY THE CHANGING WATER LEVEL 
IN THE OKA RIVER 
Water 
level rise 
Threats / Expected 
consequences Response 
>10 cm Flood Alert 
Inform citizens, deploy the 
equipment and set up 
temporary barriers 
>10cm 
and 
keeps 
rising 
Flood emergency 
Declare emergency situation, 
evacuate people; prepare 
temporary accommodation 
> 25cm 
Minor damages in living 
areas; risk of disrupted water 
supply 
Emergency water supply; 
patrol flooded zones, provide 
boats and reinforce water 
barriers 
>40cm Risk of severe damage in living areas 
Rescue operations; secure 
bridges and organize 
deviations 
>45cm Disrupted road traffic 
Close the pontoon bridge; 
secure strategic infrastructure 
facilities (industrial storages, 
electric power plant, etc.) 
>60cm 
Severe damages in living and 
industrial areas; Risk of 
presence of toxic substances 
in the river; Disrupted 
electricity supply 
Rescuing operations; 
chemical control of water; 
evacuation of industrial 
storage facilities; temporal 
accommodation for citizens 
> 75cm Disrupted railway communication Close the railway bridge 
The flood crisis terminates when the water level gets back 
to normal, the response operations are terminated and the post-
crisis reconstructions begin. 
IV. MODELING THE FLOOD MANAGEMENT PROCESS : 
ACTIVITY-ORIENTED PARADIGM 
The underlying processes in COSOC (including flood 
management process) are specified using the activity-oriented 
modeling paradigm. In this section, we examine the current 
model of the flood management process specified using 
BPMN. We analyze to what extent this specification supports 
flexibility by answering the questions stated in the introduction. 
A. BPMN model of Flood Management Process in COSOC 
The goal of the flood management process supported by 
COSOC is to dispatch the assignments for operation 
procedures according to the crisis development and in 
agreement with the rules defined by MES and other regulating 
authorities. The selected procedures are carried out by actors or 
groups of actors involved into crisis handling (MES, police 
taskforce, fire brigades, etc.). 
 Following the activity-driven modeling paradigm, the flood 
management process is explicitly modeled as a preordered set 
of tasks with predefined triggering conditions (BPMN events).  
Each process task represents an assignment that will be carried 
out by a designated actor or team. 
 Fig. 3 illustrates the flood management process as specified 
and implemented in COSOC.  This diagram has been made 
with BizAgi Process Modeler [31]. For the purpose of this 
article, we simplified the original model while preserving the 
process logics, structure and main process elements. 
There are four main actors defined for the flood 
management process: COSOC, MES, Police Taskforce and 
Environment. The Environment actor represents the 
infrastructure that provides in a real-time the information about 
the flood (e.g., social networks, wireless sensors, video 
cameras, other measurement equipment). Each process actor is 
modeled as a separate pool in Fig. 3. We show the process 
details only for the COSOC actor; other actors appear as 
"empty" boxes. 
Following the flood scenario in Table I, the BPMN model 
identifies the major flood phases (based on the events received 
from the environment or from the MES and Police Taskforce) 
and specifies the operation procedures accordingly. The list of 
events is presented in Table II. The “water level” alerts (e.g., 
E0, E2, E3, E6, E8, E12 in the model) are generated 
automatically by the infrastructure, once the corresponding 
threshold is reached for the first time. Other events are 
extracted from the reports provided by the human actors. They 
typically indicate the beginning and the end of the operation 
procedures and report on specific issues during the execution 
of these procedures that require immediate reaction (e.g., E4, 
E7a, E9a, E10a, E11a in Table II). 
The flood management process is triggered when the water 
lever h in the Oka River rises above 10 cm (E0: Flood Alert). 
In response to this alert, temporary flood barriers are set up 
(T1).  If within the following 12h the water level h goes back to 
normal – the process terminates by sending E1: End of Flood 
Alert message to MES.  Otherwise, the state of emergency is 
declared, Police Taskforce starts to patrol the area and the 
evacuation of citizens from the flooded zones is carried out 
(T2-T4). 
The next phase of the flood management is triggered when 
the water level h rises above 25 cm. Here, COSOC generates 
assignments for Police Taskforce to provide boats and to start 
the emergency water provisioning (T5, T6). For simplicity, we 
omit the message flows between the actors in Fig. 3. 
From this point, the Police Taskforce regularly reports on 
the situation sending messages to COSOC. The system uses 
these messages for a detailed situation analysis and for 
planning the next activities. The decision-making logic is 
modeled with a complex gateway G4 in the BPMN diagram.  
 
 
Fig. 3.The BPMN model of the flood management process implemented in COSOC 
TABLE II.  LIST OF EVENTS PROCESSED BY COSOC 
ID From To Description 
E0 Environment COSOC Flood Alert: h > 10 cm  
E1 COSOC MES End of Alert 
E2 Environment COSOC Emergency: h >10 cm 
and keeps rising 
E3 Environment COSOC Elevated Risk: h > 25 cm 
E4 Police Taskforce COSOC Request for resources 
(e.g., manpower, 
equipment)  
E5 MES COSOC Report: resources are 
sent 
E6 Environment COSOC High Risk: h > 40 cm 
E7 Police Taskforce COSOC Request for evacuation 
E7a MES COSOC Report: evacuation is 
terminated 
E8 Environment COSOC Alert: h > 45 cm 
E9 Police Taskforce COSOC Request for rescue 
operation  
E9a MES COSOC Report: rescue operation 
is terminated 
E10 Police Taskforce COSOC Alert: streets are flooded 
E10a Police Taskforce COSOC Report: streets are 
cleaned 
E11 Police Taskforce COSOC Alert: electric power 
plant is flooded 
E11a Police Taskforce COSOC Report: electric power 
plant is secured 
E12 Environment COSOC Below Critical: h< 25cm 
E13 COSOC MES End of Emergency 
 
Here, various operation procedures can be (inclusively) 
selected based on the activation conditions (i.e., a specific 
event or combination of events occurred). Once the selected 
operation procedure terminates the control returns to G4 and 
a new iteration begins. 
The same activity can be triggered several times if its 
activation condition is satisfied.  
For example, T17: Pump out water from the streets can 
be triggered several times during the flood. Along those 
lines, some tasks will not be executed, as their activation 
condition is not met. 
Some operation procedures produce the outcomes 
(events), which, in their turn, can trigger the other operation 
procedures. For example, during the execution of T8: Rescue 
operation, the lack of resources can be experienced (E4), 
triggering T7: Request for Reinforcements. Other examples 
of operation procedures and their associated outcomes are 
presented in Table III. 
The process is terminated when the water level falls 
below a 25cm threshold (E12). The flood barriers get 
removed, reconstructions start (T18-T19). The message 
about the end of emergency state is sent (E13). 
B. Analysis 
We claim that the level of COSOC flexibility is inherent 
to its underlying process model and, thus, strongly related to 
the selected modeling paradigm. In the following, we 
analyze the BPMN specification of the process by 
answering the three questions raised in the introduction of 
this article: 
1) How does the flood management process model 
support the run-time assessment of a crisis situation? 
The crisis situation in COSOC is assessed based on the 
contextual parameters extracted from the events that the 
system continuously receives. 
The number and type of contextual parameters are 
defined in the process model at design time. For COSOC 
flood management process, these parameters include the 
water level in Oka River, the air temperature, the surface and 
the characteristics of the flooded zones (e.g., presence of 
medical, childcare facilities, strategic objects etc.), the status 
of infrastructure in the flooded zones (water supply, 
electricity supply, telecommunications, roads), the amount of 
damage, incidents, the status of the ongoing response 
operations, etc. 
Police and MES teams can transmit additional 
information about the situation. However, this information is 
not processed by the system. New events, contextual 
parameters or rules for triggering operation procedures can 
be introduced on the model level (i.e., by changing the 
BPMN specification). However, these modifications will not 
have an effect on the running instance of the COSOC flood 
management process. Therefore, no capacity to dynamically 
add a new contextual parameter is supported. 
Our case study shows that the system (based on fixed 
contextual parameters) and the process manager (based on 
the additional information and personal experience) 
frequently come to different conclusions regarding the crisis 
situation assessment. For example, in certain conditions, 
emergency water provisioning (T6) might be required even 
before the Elevated Risk Alert (E3) is received. In such 
situations, the process manager has a choice: to “leave the 
system decide” (potentially leading to suboptimal or even 
erroneous scenarios) or to make decision himself/herself and 
to adapt the scenario proposed by the system. 
In the following, we analyze the capacity of the activity-
oriented process model to support such adaptations.  
2) To what extent does the flood management process 
model allow for run-time scenario adaptation according to 
this assessment? 
All possible flood management scenarios that the 
COSOC system supports are explicitly specified in the 
BPMN model at design time.  
Once the flood management process is triggered – the 
model is instantiated. At run time, the appropriate response 
(activity) is defined automatically according to the evaluated 
conditions specified in the model. In certain cases, the 
system calculates the list of alternative responses and offers 
the process manager to make a choice. 
The complex gateway G4 specifies the flood 
management scenario in a flexible way: the activities can be 
executed in various combinations and repeated multiple 
times before the process is terminated. However, only 
“predefined by design” activities can be triggered. When 
required, new activities can be added or the process logic can 
be changed on the model level. However, these modifications 
will not take effect for the running process instance in 
COSOC. Therefore, no adaptation of the process scenario at 
run time is supported. 
Automated scenario definition reduces the risk of human 
errors related to decision-making in stressful conditions and 
information overload. In practice, however, the process 
manager handles many situations off-line, by communicating 
with the response team and by determining and adapting the 
crisis management scenarios according to their experience. 
Such adaptations and newly discovered scenario are 
extremely valuable for further evolution of the process and 
its implementing system.  
In the following we analyze the activity-oriented model 
evolution capacity.  
3) How does the flood management process model 
assimilate the new scenarios proposed by the process 
manager and what is the cycle of process evolution or 
redesign? 
Whenever an unforeseen situation occurs -the process 
manager needs to decline the execution of a workflow 
recommended by the system and to define and execute a new 
workflow that is better adapted for a situation. For example, 
due to the road conditions, specific vehicles cannot reach the 
flooded areas; in this case, the rescue operations (T8) can be 
carried out by helicopters only, or immediate evacuation has 
to be triggered. Such situations and the corresponding 
(adapted) scenarios defined at run time by the process 
manager have a great value for further process evolution and 
improvement.  
 The business process lifecycle in COSOC follows the 
main stages defined in BPM and involves (re)design, 
configuration, enactment and evaluation [32]. 
 Our experience shows that the process manager rarely 
has an expertise to undergo a new workflow definition: 
he/she often switches to the “off-line” mode and manages the 
process manually (e.g., by sending messages, making phone 
calls and so on). Therefore, the new scenarios are rarely 
getting integrated into the process model during the process 
enactment. They can be included into the process model only 
during evaluation and redesign. In this case, the new 
scenarios for crisis management process are designed with 
the assistance of domain experts (process manager and other 
actors are involved) than modeled by the process designer, 
tested and integrated into the system. 
 Due to the long re-design cycle, the expertise of the 
process manager cannot be regularly transformed into 
process improvements and can therefore be lost. 
C. Summary 
Within the activity-oriented paradigm, the contextual 
parameters and the decision-making logic are predefined in 
design-time. No run-time modifications are possible. The 
model explicitly defines activities associated with decisions. 
Even though the invocation order of activities is specified at 
run-time, according to received events, adding new activities 
or changing the event-activity association at run-time is not 
supported. 
New scenarios can be integrated into the process model 
after process redesign. However, they will not take effect on 
the process instances that are currently running. 
From the system perspective, the automated run-time 
assessment of a crisis situation and scenario definition 
ensures a full compliance with norms and regulations and 
reduces the risk of human errors. The unforeseen situations, 
however, have to be coordinated “off-line”, with the resulted 
scenarios poorly traced in the system, preventing from 
process improvement. The lessons learned are typically 
discussed “after action” and can lead to the system update 
only after a long cycle of process model evaluation and 
redesign. 
V. MODELING THE FLOOD MANAGEMENT PROCESS : 
STATE-ORIENTED PARADIGM 
In this section, we apply the state-oriented paradigm for 
modeling flood management process. We examine the 
interest of this paradigm for modeling crisis management 
processes and show that within this paradigm, some 
shortcomings identified in the previous section can be 
solved. 
Within the state-oriented paradigm, a process is 
described by a set of states and transitions between these 
states. Process execution starts at an initial state and 
terminates at a final state. A state transition is triggered 
when some condition is fulfilled. The sequence of states and 
transitions that leads from the initial state to the final state 
can be seen as a process scenario. 
Some state-oriented approaches (e.g., Petri Net) associate 
a transition with the execution of one concrete activity (or a 
group of activities). On the contrary, we associate a state 
transition with the occurrence of a triggering event (or 
combinations of events). Compared to activity-oriented 
approaches that encourage the early binding of activities (at 
design-time), state-oriented paradigm supports deferred 
binding: at design-time, the process scenario can be seen as 
a sequence of events. The concrete activities that will 
produce these events can be selected or event “invented” in 
run-time. 
Following this paradigm shift, a process specification is 
divided into two parts: the state-transition part, defined with 
a set of states and transitions between states and their 
triggering events, and the activity part, defined by a list of 
activities specified by their preconditions and outcomes. The 
process enactment can be seen as a dynamic selection of 
activities to produce some outcomes (events) that make the 
process progress towards its (desired) final state. 
A. Statecharts model of Flood Management Process in 
COSOC 
We design a state-oriented model of the flood 
management process preserving the semantics of the 
existing BPMN process model specified in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 
illustrates the specification of the flood management process 
made in the YAKINDU Statechart Tool [33] using the 
formalism of statecharts [17]. 
Statecharts describe the process with a set of states (e.g., 
S0: Flood Alert, S1: Flood Emergency, E2: Restoring 
Normal Functioning, etc.) and transitions between them. 
Each state transition can be triggered by a specific event or 
combination of events (the event E2: h > 10 cm and keeps 
rising triggers a transition from S0 to S1). To maintain the 
consistency with the BPMN specification, in the statecharts 
specification we use the same list of events (Table II). 
Activities are not explicitly modeled in the statecharts 
diagram. The relationships between activities and events 
(i.e., possible activity outcomes) are illustrated in Table III.  
In the statecharts notation, states are depicted by 
rectangular boxes with rounded corners. Statecharts use the 
notion of hierarchical state: this economical visual notation 
allows to specify real-size systems avoiding state explosion. 
The substate–superstate relation is depicted by boxes 
encapsulation. State transitions are represented with arrows 
and labeled with triggering events. 
We define three main states for the flood management 
process: S0: Flood Alert, S1: Flood Emergency and S2: 
Restoring Normal Functioning (we indicate the rough 
correspondence between the states defined in the statecharts 
specification and the BPMN specification in Fig.3). S1 is 
refined in two substates: S1.1.: Preparation and S1.2.: 
Emergency Control. The former corresponds to the part of 
the BPMN specification where the preparations of the city 
facing the flood are carried out according to the MES 
regulations (i.e., the state of emergency is declared, citizens 
are informed, the evacuation of citizens from flooded zones 
is started etc.). S1.2. is triggered when the water level in 
Oka River rises above 25 cm (E3 in Table II). 
Statecharts can model concurrency: Living Area, 
Transport, Electric Power Plant and Resources are four 
parallel sub-machines that describe the domains of flood 
management. When entering S1.2., the process 
simultaneously enters the (default) state in each 
corresponding sub-machine. Black circles with an outgoing 
arrow indicate default states.  
Living Area sub-machine defines three states: Elevated 
Risk, High Risk and Unsecured. The transitions between 
these states describe how a flood will progress and will be 
managed: Elevated Risk is entered when the water level h 
rises above 25 cm (E3). The events received from Police 
Taskforce (e.g., requests for evacuation, rescue operations 
etc.) or from the environment (further rise of water level) 
trigger the High Risk state. The events E7a, E9a, E10a 
trigger the transition back to the “safer state” Elevated Risk. 
These events result from execution of some operation 
procedures (e.g., evacuation, rescue, pumping the water out 
of the streets or others). The state Unsecured is triggered 
when the event E4 indicating the lack of resources during 
execution of an operation procedure occurs. This event also 
triggers a transition in the Resources sub-machine from 
Crisis Control to Insufficient Resources. Once the resources 
are obtained (i.e., E5 is broadcasted) – transitions back to 
Crisis Control and High Risk are triggered in the respective 
sub-machines. 
Along those lines Electric Power Plant sub-machine 
shows how the electric power plant (a strategic 
infrastructure object) is managed during the flood. 
According to the regulations, the power plant must be Shut 
Down when the water level rises above 40 cm (E6). If the 
water keeps rising – there is a risk that this facility will be 
flooded. Here the Unsecured state is triggered until the 
successful securing of the power plant (E11a) is reported. 
Transport sub-machine is described with three states that 
are entered based on the water level: first, the Normal 
Functioning is maintained; when the water h rises above 
40cm – only Limited Traffic is supported; when the water 
level h exceeds 45 cm threshold – the pontoon bridge has to 
be closed (Bridge Closed). 
In our example, each state of the statechart can be 
associated with the list of obligatory and optional activities 
that must/can be carried out upon entering, upon exiting and 
while in this state. 
With the state-oriented paradigm, the objective of the 
flood management process can be reformulated as follows: 
the process participants (i.e., MES and Police Taskforce) 
should respond to the events that occur in the environment 
(e.g., rise of water, weather changes etc.) by executing the 
operation procedures and producing the outcomes in order 
to maintain the secure functioning of the city in specified 
domains. 
TABLE III.  RELATIONS BETWEEN ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS IN COSOC 
FLOOD MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Activities Events 
T4. Evacuate people E4, E9, E7a 
T7. Request reinforcements E5 
T8. Rescue operations E4, E9a 
T9. Pump out water E4, E9, E10a 
T11. Secure electric power station E4, E9, E7, E11a 
 
Fig.4. Statecharts diagram of COSOC flood management process 
During the execution, decisions about specific operation 
procedures are taken according to a crisis situation that is 
described by a current configuration of the statecharts (i.e., 
the set of active states). To model the decision-making logic 
(according to the BPMN specification) we complement the 
statecharts diagram in Fig. 4 with a list of activities that can 
be executed according to the outcome they can produce 
(Table III). Contrary to the BPMN specification, activities 
are bound to the process scenario only at run time. 
B. Analysis 
In this section, we explore the advantages and the limits 
of the statecharts specification. We structure our analysis by 
answering the questions raised in the introduction.  
 
(a) Scenario: E0àE2àE3àE6àE4 
 
(b) Scenario: E0àE2àE3àE6àE4àE5 
 
(c)Scenario: E0àE2àE3àE6àE4àE5àE7a 
Fig. 5. Simulation of flood management process with YAKINDU 
simulation tool. Current situation is described by the four active (red) states 
1) How does the flood management process model 
support the run-time assessment of a crisis situation? 
We have designed the process specification with the 
YAKINDU statecharts modeler. The YAKINDU simulation 
environment allows us to instantiate the statecharts 
specification and to simulate the process. 
During the process simulation, the crisis situation in 
statecharts specification is represented by a current active 
configuration in the statecharts diagram. In Fig. 5 (a), the 
active configuration describes the crisis situation where, due 
to the water level h > 40 cm (E6 received) the Electric 
Power Plant is Shut Down and the Limited Traffic is 
maintained; due to the lack of resources (E4 received), the 
Living Area is Unsecured. 
Once resources are received from MES (E5), the 
Resources sub-machine goes to the Crisis Control state 
whereas the Living Area returns to the High Risk state where 
some operation procedures need to be terminated (Fig. 5 
(b)). When the corresponding procedures are terminated 
(E7a or E9a or E10a are received), the Living Area returns 
to the Elevated Risk state. 
As for BPMN, the numbers of states and state transitions 
in statecharts are explicitly specified at design time. 
Addition or modification of states or state transitions can be 
done as a part of redesign and does not take effect on the 
running process instance (i.e., the current active 
configuration cannot be changed).  
2) To what extent does the flood management process model 
allow for run-time scenario adaptation according to this 
assessment? 
The state-oriented paradigm allows for deferred activity 
planning:an activity can be defined at run time, based on the 
desired outcome and on the context (i.e., resources, etc.). 
TABLE IV.  ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITIES INTEGRATED AT RUN TIME 
Activities Events 
T4. Evacuate people (by land) E4, E9, E7a 
T4a. Evacuate people (by air) E4, E9, E7a 
T7. Request reinforcements E5 
T7a. Call for volunteers E5 
T8. Rescue operations E4, E9a 
T8a. Rescue operations (by air) E4, E9a 
 
In responce to unforceen conditions, the process manager 
can select from the available activities. Thanks to deferred 
binding, she can alsodefinea new activity better adapted for 
a situation. Table IV shows some examples of alternative 
activities not previewed by the original flood management 
procedures (and not specified in BPMN in Fig.3) but 
proposed by the process manager. For example, when the 
lack of resources message (E4) was received while pumping 
out the water, instead of requesting the reinforcements from 
MES, the city managed the situation by calling volunteers 
(T7a). This activity produced the same desired outcome  
(E5) as T7 while being better adapted for the current 
situation. 
New activities or sequences of activities can be 
integrated into the process scenario “on the fly”, without 
redesigning a process model. 
3) How does the flood management process model 
assimilate the new scenarios proposed by the process 
manager and what is the cycle of process evolution or 
redesign? 
The integration of new activities and events in the 
process specification can be done on fly, without 
redesigning the cycle. Definition of new states, transitions, 
triggering events, and refinement of states is a subject of 
redesign cycle. 
C. Summary 
Within the state-oriented paradigm, contextual 
parameters and decision-making logic is predefined at design 
time and cannot be modified at run time.  
Activities are not associated with state transitions and 
thus do not have to be explicitly defined by the model. 
Thanks to the deferred activity planning mechanism, the 
process manager can select a concrete activity at run time, 
based on the desired outcome and on the context (i.e., 
resources etc.). Adding new activities or changing the 
outcome-activity association at run-time is possible.  
From the system perspective, the state-oriented paradigm 
creates a recommendation system where the process manager 
plays the leading role in scenario definition. Unforeseen 
situations are handled within the system enabling seamless 
improvement of the process.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Crisis handling requires high agility and reactivity and 
never follows the same scenario. 
Focusing on efficiency, reliability and control of 
scenario executions, a PAIS supporting crisis management 
substantially reduces the risk of errors associated with 
information overload and human decision making under 
stressful conditions. However, PAIS capacity to support the 
user (operator or process manager) in recognizing and 
handling the situations that are not covered by predefined 
scenarios remains limited. 
Our experience with COSOC shows that a concrete flood 
management scenario relies a lot on the experience and 
decisions of the process manager. Assessment of a situation, 
adaptive scenario planning and handling the unpredictable 
situations represent challenges for the supporting information 
system. 
In this work, we were motivated by the lessons learned 
from working with COSOC: 
a) Crisis management (and flood management in particular) 
cannot be fully automated by COSOC: while COSOC 
implements the regulations defined by MES, the process is 
still largely based on the tacit knowledge of the process 
manager. Fully prescriptive process model leaves very little 
room for this tacit knowledge to be implemented. 
b) In COSOC, we have "full automation", when the system 
executes the predefined workflows, or "no automation" when 
the case is getting unpredictable and the process manager 
goes to “off-line” mode. Providing recommendations and 
assisting in decision making are valuable capabilities to 
develop. 
c) The re-design cycle for COSOC is long and complex. 
“Best practices” from the process manager are not 
systematically documented. Embedded knowledge 
management is a useful capability to develop in COSOC. 
In this paper, we show on the example of COSOC that 
the capacity of PAIS to support flexibility of the process is 
inherent to the underlying process modeling paradigm. We 
examined the BPMN (activity-oriented) specification of the 
flood management process designed for COSOC and 
proposed an alternative (state-oriented) specification of the 
same process made with statecharts. 
 While ensuring compliance with the norms and 
regulations, the activity-oriented paradigm provides very 
limited support for process flexibility at run time. 
Unforeseen situations cannot be handled within this 
paradigm since all activities and triggering events them need 
to be identified at design time. 
The state-oriented paradigm allows us to exclude 
activities from the process design: we can state that "any 
activity is good as soon as it produces a desired outcome". 
In particular, it enables deferred activity planning, that gives 
more freedom to the process manager in choosing an 
activity that is adapted for a concrete situation. 
This paradigm also allows for expanding the notion of a 
“management” system, providing the knowledge worker 
with guidance, decision support and knowledge management 
capabilities. These capabilities are valuable not only for 
PAIS supporting crisis management but also for PAIS 
supporting KiPs in general. 
The process specification with statecharts has a practical 
interest for the current COSOC system. The Colored KI 
matrix used in COSOC for visualization of the current 
situation (Fig.2) can be obtained from the statecharts 
specification by associating a color to certain states or state 
configurations: once such a configuration is visited – the 
corresponding area of the Colored KI matrix is recolored. 
 The statecharts formalism has originally been developed 
for the design and simulation of complex discrete-event 
systems and thus its visual notation can be considered too 
minimalistic compared to BPMN. Extension of statecharts 
for the specifics of crisis management processes 
specification is a subject of our future work. 
 In this paper, we used YAKINDU modeling environment 
for specification and simulation of the flood management 
process. The possibility to animate the specification, to play 
different scenarios and to obtain the immediate visual 
feedback is very appealing and makes the design process 
extremely interactive and pleasant. 
Although the extension of the notation and the adaptation 
of the simulation environment for the specifics of crisis 
management processes are desirable, we consider that the 
state-oriented modeling with statecharts has a great potential 
for crisis management process modeling. 
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